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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20010060-CA

Appellee/Petitioner,
vs.
JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN,
Appellant/Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
• * *

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REHEARING
In paragraph 7 of its opinion, did the Court impose a greater burden on the proponent
of a peremptory strike in explaining the reasons for the strike than that required by the United
States Supreme Court?
RELIEF REQUESTED
The State asks the Court to amend its opinion to clarify the proper burden carried by
the State once a defendant has made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in
the State's exercise of a peremptory strike.
COURT'S OPINION
A copy of the Court's opinion, State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT 363, — Utah Adv. Rep. —,
is reproduced in Addendum A.
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ARGUMENT
THE OPINION SHOULD BE AMENDED TO REFLECT UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
In paragraph 7 of the opinion, the Court outlined the three-step process for
determining whether a peremptory strike violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Referring to the second step, the
Court held:
Under our jurisprudence, once the prima facie case has been established, the
proponent of a peremptory strike must provide the trial court with a neutral
explanation. And while the United States Supreme Court has determined that
this explanation need be neither genuinely persuasive nor even entirely
plausible, in Utah the reasons given for striking a potential juror must be, at
the very least, facially neutral, reasonably clear and specific, related to the
case being tried, and legitimate.
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, atf 7 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The second
sentence suggests that Utah courts impose additional requirements upon the proponent of a
strike, and thus a greater burden, than does the United States Supreme Court. This, our state
courts cannot do. As recently observed by the Utah Supreme Court, "the United States
Supreme Court has been vested with final authority in interpreting the federal Constitution
since the inception of our republic/' State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^ 46,37 P.3d 1073 (citing
U.S Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1, andMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60
(1803)).
The four requirements referred to by the Court in paragraph 7 in fact originate from
the United States Supreme Court decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,106 S.Ct. 1712
(1986). In that case, the high court held that once the defendant makes a prima facie
2

showing, the burden shifts to the State to offer "a neutral explanation related to the particular
case to be tried. Id. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. In further explaining that burden, the
Court noted that "the prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of
his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Id. at 98 n.20,106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.20
(citations omitted).
Based on the foregoing languagefromBatson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the prosecutor "must at least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for
believing those factors will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or her duties
as a juror." Purkett v. Elem, 25 F.3d 679,683 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). The Eighth
Circuit thus equated "legitimate with "plausible." On certiorari review, the United States
Supreme Court rejected that notion, holding as follows:
[These requirements were] meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could
satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he had a
discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith. What it means
by a "legitimate reason" is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that
does not deny equal protection.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765,769,115 S.Ct. 1769,1771 (1995). The high court thus held
that "[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible." Id. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. The Court held that "'[u]nless a
discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral.999 Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S 352, 360, 111 S.Ct.
1859, 1866 (1991) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added).

3

The Court's language in paragraph 7, therefore, creates two potential misconcepti
First, the Court indicates that "the United States Supreme Court has determined that [the
prosecutor's] explanation need be neither genuinely persuasive nor even entirely plausible."
Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, at f 7 (emphasis added). Use of the word "entirely" suggests
that the explanation be slightly or somewhat plausible. The Supreme Court did not impose
such a restriction, but held that even "silly or superstitious" explanations, so long as they
were not inherently discriminatory, would meet the State's burden in step two (though likely
not in step three). Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771.
Second, by indicating that Utah requires that "the reasons given for striking a potential
juror must be, at the very least, facially neutral, reasonably clear and specific, related to the
case being tried, and legitimate," the Court implies that a "legitimate" reason is something
more than a non-discriminatory reason. However, as the United States Supreme Court in
Purkett explained, "a 'legitimate reason* is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that
does not deny equal protection," i.e., that is not inherently discriminatory. 514 U.S. at 769,
115 S.Ct. at 1771. The language used by the Court also suggests that Utah imposes a greater
burden on the prosecutor in meeting the second step. However, as noted above, the Court
is not at liberty to impose a greater burden with regard to the federal Equal Protection Clause.
See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 46.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully petitions this Court to amend
paragraph 7 of its opinion in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court decision in Purkett
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NOV 0 7 2002
Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court
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State of Utah,

)

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

Case No. 20010060-CA

v.

FILED
(November 7, 2002)

Jeffery Ray Chatwin,
Defendant and Appellant.

2002 UT App 363,

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys: Heather Johnson and John D. 0!Connell Jr., Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Thorne.
THORNE, Judge:
Hi
Defendant Jeffery Ray Chatwin appeals from his conviction of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, following a jury
trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
BACKGROUND
12
In June of 2000, after being charged with aggravated assault
following a reported domestic disturbance, Chatwin pleaded not
guilty. The trial court then set a November 21, 2000 trial date.
On the morning of November 21, a jury venire was assembled and
the trial court conducted voir dire. Following voir dire, the
court directed the parties to select the jury.
H3
After the normal process of jury selection was completed,
the trial court excused the selected panel to address a concern
raised by Chatwinfs counsel. During the exercise of peremptory
challenges, Chatwin's counsel observed that the Prosecutor had
struck the sole minority who had been included in the venire.
Chatwin's counsel raised this as a concern to the trial court,

and, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712
(1986), the trial court directed the prosecutor to explain his
reasons for excusing the minority venire person.
f4
The prosecutor, after briefly challenging whether Chatwin
had established a prima facie case of discrimination, explained
that he had struck the potential juror not on the basis of race,
but because he felt
that this jury would be better able to
deliberate the evidence that I anticipate[d]
presenting to it if [the jury was] balanced
between men and women. I therefore made
efforts to take men off of the jury. That
may not make a great deal of sense, but that
was the game plan. [The venire person] was a
man, I took him because he was a man . . . .
Hearing this, Chatwin's counsel then informed the trial court
Batson had been extended to prohibit the use of gender, as well
as race, as a reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. See
J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). The
trial court, however, discounted counsel's statement, explaining:
Well, I am not prepared to state that the
challenge was inappropriate. It appears to
me that there's been a justification for
exercising the challenge . . . . And
moreover I'm not persuaded that in a case of
this nature, specifically a spousal-abuse
type of case, that selecting jurors, be they
male or female which the Prosecutor or
Defense for that matter decides might be more
inclined to adhere to the Prosecution's
theory of the case or the Defense's theory,
for instance, that that was an inappropriate
way or manner or justification for a
challenge.
Thus, the trial court denied Chatwin's challenge to the
prosecutor's strike and seated the jury as selected. Chatwin was
then tried and convicted of aggravated assault, and subsequently
sentenced to spend not more than five years in the Utah State
Prison. The trial court, however, suspended this sentence and
placed Chatwin on probation for one year. Chatwin now appeals.
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
15
Chatwin argues that the prosecution's stated reason for
striking the potential juror was not neutral and constituted
illegal discrimination. Thus, he continues, the trial court
erred in countenancing the prosecutor's behavior. Absent a
showing of clear error, we will not overturn a trial court's
determination concerning the discriminatory intent embodied in a
party's explanation for the exercise of a peremptory challenge.
Se& State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,15, 41 P.3d 1153.
ANALYSIS
f6
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
governs the exercise of peremptory challenges," J.E.B., 511 U.S.
at 128, 114 S. Ct. at 1421, and "[i]ntentional discrimination on
the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection
Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to
ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad
stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women." Id.
at 130-31, 114 S. Ct. at 1422; aggprfl State v. Sheppard. 1999 UT
App 305,128, 989 P.2d 503; see also State v. Colwell. 2000 UT
8,^14-22, 994 P.2d 177. Accordingly, if a party's reasons for
the exercise of a peremptory challenge are discriminatory on
their face, the trial court has a duty to disallow that challenge
and failure to do so constitutes clear error that will result in
our reversing an otherwise error-free conviction, and remanding
the case for a new trial. See J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 145-46, 114 S.
Ct. at 1430; Cannon. 2002 UT App 18 at 1111-13.
17
To limit the possibility of discrimination creeping into our
jury selection process, we have developed a body of law that
establishes a well-defined path that must be followed once the
opponent to a peremptory strike establishes a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination regarding that strike (or series of
strikes). See, e.g.. Colwell. 2000 UT 8 at 1l7; Cannon. 2002 UT
App 18 at 116-13; Sheppard. 1999 UT App 305 at 1128-29. Under
our jurisprudence, once the prima facie case has been
established, the proponent of a peremptory strike must provide
the trial court with a neutral explanation. See Colwell, 2000 UT
8 at 1117, 19; Cannon. 2002 UT App 18 at 116-13; Sheppard. 1999
UT App 305 at 128. And while the United States Supreme Court has
determined that this explanation need be neither genuinely
persuasive nor even entirely plausible, see Purkett v. Elem. 514
U.S. 765, 769, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (per curiam), in Utah
the reasons given for striking a potential juror must be, at the
very least, facially neutral, reasonably clear and specific,
related to the case being tried, and legitimate. See Cannon,
2002 UT App 18 at 19. Finally, should the strike's proponent
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tender a neutral explanation, the trial court must then look
beyond the explanation, if possible, to determine whether the
strike was purposefully discriminatory. See id. at 1l3
18
Here, in response to the argument mounted by Chatwin on
appeal, the State asserts that at trial Chatwin failed to carry
his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
Thus, the State continues, the trial court erred in requiring the
Prosecutor to explain his reason for striking the potential
juror. However, we conclude that because Chatwin raised this
issue in the context of Batson and under the Federal Equal
Protection Clause, this issue is controlled by the rule
established in Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352, 111 S. Ct.
1859 (1991) . In Hernandez, the State of New York offered an
argument similar to the argument offered by the State in the
instant case. See id. at 359, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. There, after
the defendant had raised an objection to the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude potential Latino jurors from the
panel, the prosecutor offered his reasons for the challenges
"without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court." Id.1
19
On appeal, the Supreme Court was not concerned with the
effect of the prosecutor's decision to offer an explanation or
the trial court's acquiescence with the prosecutor's decision.
See id. Instead, the Court determined that " [o]nce a prosecutor
has offered [an] explanation for the peremptory challenges and
the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant
has made a prima facie showing becomes moot." Id. While we see
no reason this rule should not apply equally to cases involving
alleged gender discrimination, in the instant case, Chatwin's
initial challenge focused on the excused juror's minority status;
thus, the Hernandez rule is clearly applicable.
1l0 Therefore, because the prosecutor offered an explanation for
his peremptory challenge and the trial court ruled on the
ultimate question, we conclude that any discussion concerning
Chatwin's attempt to establish a prima facie case is moot.
Accordingly, we focus our analysis on the Prosecutor's
explanation and, if necessary, the trial court's conclusions
concerning the Prosecutor's explanation.

1. We acknowledge that, unlike the situation presented in
Hernandez, here the prosecutor attempted to argue that Chatwin
had failed to establish a prima facie case prior to providing the
required explanation. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
356, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1856 (1991). We do not, however, see this
as material to our analysis.
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111 Chatwin argues that the explanation proffered by the
Prosecutor in defense of his peremptory challenge clearly
violated both the spirit and the letter of the Equal Protection
Clause as highlighted by J.E.B. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145, 114
S. Ct. at 1430. In response, the State argues that Chatwin has
misinterpreted the scope of J.E.B. and that the Prosecutor's
strike was neither gender-based nor did it violate the principles
articulated in J.E.B. In making this argument, the State offers
three alternative explanations. We address each in turn.
112 At oral argument the State asserted that because this case
involves gender and not race, the explanation of the Prosecutor
and the decision of the trial court are subject to a less
rigorous standard of review. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995) (»[A]11
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests."), with Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hoaan. 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S. Ct. 3331,
3336 (1982) (stating that state action involving gender
classification must serve an important governmental objective and
be substantially related to the achievement of that objective).
However, not only was this argument made for the first time at
oral argument and unsupported by any relevant case law, our
review of the relevant case law suggests that it is wholly
inapplicable. S££ Aflar«Wl CQngt^gfrQrg, lx\Q. v. Minet;^, 534 U.S.
103, 109, 122 S. Ct. 511, 513-14 (2001) (per curiam) (stating
"application of our [heightened] scrutiny standard should be
addressed in the first instance by the lower courts" (quotations
and citation omitted)).
113 Rather, we conclude that the plain language of J.E.B. itself
provides the proper analytical framework for examining any
possible equal protection violations during jury selection. In
J.E.B., the Court stated that "[w]hen persons are excluded from
participation in our democratic processes solely because of
[either] race or gender, [the] promise of equity dims, and the
integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized." 511 U.S. at
146, 114 S. Ct. at 1430. Moreover, the Court categorically
stated that "[f]ailing to provide jurors the same protection
against gender discrimination as race discrimination could
frustrate the purpose of Batson itself." Id. at 145, 114 S. Ct.
at 1430 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to the State's
suggestion at oral argument, possible gender discrimination in
the jury selection process is subject to the same examination as
possible racial discrimination. See id. at 154-55, 114 U.S. at
1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the court erred
in failing to apply intermediate scrutiny).
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f14 Accordingly, J.E.B. mandates that whether the perceived
discrimination involves race or gender, the responsible party
must provide a facially neutral explanation for the strike or the
peremptory challenge violates equal protection. See id. at 145,
114 S. Ct. at 1430. Should the record support a finding that the
prosecutor provided the trial court with a facially neutral
explanation, regardless of whether the challenger's objection is
based upon race or gender, we then review the trial court's
findings for clear error. See Cannon, 2002 UT App 18 at 1|5.
Therefore, contrary to the State's position at oral argument, we
examine the record to first determine whether the prosecutor's
explanation was neutral on its face, and then, if necessary, we
proceed to examine the trial court's findings and conclusions.
115 The State next argues that rather than eliminating gender as
an acceptable reason for a peremptory challenge, J.E.B. merely
forbids the use of gender stereotypes in peremptory challenges.
We disagree.
116 In J.E.B, the respondent, the State of Alabama, filed a
paternity suit against the petitioner and used its peremptory
challenges solely for the purpose, of removing male jurors from
the jury pool, SSS J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 129, 114. S. Ct. at 1422.
The petitioner appealed on equal protection grounds and the
Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "gender, like race, is an
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."
Id. at 129, 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
fl7 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court noted that
"[b]ecause [gender] stereotypes have wreaked injustice in so many
other spheres of our country's public life, active discrimination
by litigants on the basis of gender during the jury selection
invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its
obligation to adhere to the law." Id. at 140, 114 S. Ct. at 1427
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the Court continued,
gender-related peremptory challenges are extremely suspect "in
cases where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases
involving rape, sexual harassment, or paternity." Id. The
Court's concern, therefore, focused not simply on stereotypes,
but on any use of gender in the jury selection process. After
reviewing J.E.B., we conclude that the Supreme Court's discussion
of stereotypes merely highlighted the fallacious reasoning that
often underlies gender discrimination and it was not intended to
permit so-called "non-stereotypical discrimination" as suggested
by the State. Accordingly, the State's position concerning the
central holding of J.E.B. is without merit and we conclude that
gender is an impermissible reason for a party to strike a
potential juror.
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1l8 The State1s final argument is that rather than evidencing an
intent to discriminate on the basis of gender, the Prosecutor's
explanation was merely an attempt to balance the composition of
the jury to reflect the views of both men and women. Moreover,
the State continues, such a rationale does not violate the
precepts of J.E.B. In making this argument, the State seizes
upon certain language contained in J.E.B. for support. See id.
at 141-42, 114 S. Ct. at 1428. However, our reading of this
language, and its surrounding sections, suggests that the Court
was merely explaining its rationale for prohibiting the use of
gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges, not creating an
exception. See id. In addition to noting that "gender, like
race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and
impartiality," id. at 129, 114 S. Ct. at 1421, the Court stated
that
[a]11 persons, when granted the'opportunity
to serve on a jury, have the right not to be
excluded summarily because of discriminatory
and stereotypical presumptions that reflect
and reinforce patterns of historical
discrimination. Striking individual jurors
on the assumption that they hold particular
views simply because of their gender is
"practically a brand upon them, affixed by
the law, an assertion of their inferiority."
Id. at 141-42, 114 S. Ct. at 1428 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Strawfer vT Wqgt Virginia/ 100 U.S. 303, 306
(1880)). Finally, the Court concluded that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination in jury selection on the basis

<?£ gender, or on the asgumpti<?n that an
individual will be biased in a particular
case for no reason other than the fact that
the person happens to be a woman or happens
to be a man. As with race, the "core
guarantee of equal protection, ensuring
citizens that their State will not
discriminate . . . , would be meaningless
were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on
the basis of such assumptions, which arise
solely from the jurors' [gender]."
Id. at 146, 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (alterations in original)
(emphasis added) (quoting Batsoiy 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct.
at 1723). From this language, we conclude that a proponent of a
peremptory challenge violates equal protection when that
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proponent relies upon either race or gender when explaining the
reasons underlying a peremptory challenge.
Ul9 Here, contrary to the State's argument, the Prosecutor's
explanation for the challenge to the potential juror was clearly
gender-based. While the State suggests that the Prosecutor's
intent was to seat "a jury composed of a fair cross-section of
the community," not to remove jurors based on gender, the
Constitution does not guarantee either the State or a defendant a
jury comprised of any specific gender balance or composition.2
See id. at 128, 114 S. Ct. at 1421; CJL. Tavlor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 538, 95 S. Ct. 692, 702 (1975) (articulating a similar
principle as applied to the racial composition of a jury).
Rather, the Constitution guarantees only that every defendant
will be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to
"nondiscriminatory criteria." Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.
Ct. at 1717. in attempting to create gender balance in the jury,
the Prosecutor, by necessity, was forced to dismiss at least one
potential juror on the basis of gender. Thus, the Prosecutor's
criteria was discriminatory and in violation of the potential
juror's equal protection rights.
120 Ordinarily, following our examination of the reasons
proffered to explain a peremptory challenge, our focus would
shift to examining the trial court's conclusions. See Colwell,
2000 UT 8 at 120. However, because it is clear that the
prosecutor failed to provide a facially neutral explanation for
his peremptory strike of the potential juror, and instead
provided a reason that violated equal protection guarantees, we
conclude as a matter of law that the trial court clearly erred in
allowing the prosecutor to strike the potential juror. Contrary
to the trial court's belief, there are no circumstances under
2. The State, in its brief, points to a number of cases from
outside this jurisdiction to support its argument. However,
after reviewing these cases, we conclude that they offer little
or no assistance to the State's cause. Rather, as identified by
the State, each of these cases deals with the so called "dual
motivation" analysis, which has been adopted by a number of
jurisdictions to avoid reversal when a party provides a clearly
discriminatory rationale for exercising a peremptory challenge,
but also provides at least one neutral explanation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1996);
People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1256-58 (111. 2001). Because
the Prosecutor in the instant case offered no neutral explanation
to support his peremptory strike, we do not believe these cases
offer any assistance to our analysis. Moreover, we have not
adopted the "dual motivation" analysis and we conclude that this
case does not present the proper case for its consideration.
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which a party is permitted to publicly rely upon an impermissible
classification to make decisions concerning the composition of a
jury. To hold otherwise would undermine the purpose outlined in
both Batson and J.E.B.: to protect the integrity of the jury
system and to ensure that potential jurors are not purposefully
excluded through impermissible classifications, whether or not a
party believes that it may factor into its eventual success or
failure. £e£ Ex Parte State of Alabama, 659 So. 2d 169, 174
(Ala. 1995) .
CONCLUSION
H22 We therefore reverse Chatwin's conviction and remand for a
new trial.

William A. Thorne Jr., Cudge

WE CONCUR:

Norman H Jackson,
.Judge
PresJ

Jar

Z. Davis
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